Evidence Arguments for Using Formal Methods in Software Certification by Denney, Ewen W. & Pai, Ganesh
Evidence Arguments for Using
Formal Methods in Software Certiﬁcation
Ewen Denney and Ganesh Pai
SGT / NASA Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA 94035, USA
{ewen.denney, ganesh.pai}@nasa.gov
Abstract—We describe a generic approach for automatically
integrating the output generated from a formal method/tool into a
software safety assurance case, as an evidence argument, by (a) en-
coding the underlying reasoning as a safety case pattern, and
(b) instantiating it using the data produced from the method/tool.
We believe this approach not only improves the trustworthiness
of the evidence generated from a formal method/tool, by explicitly
presenting the reasoning and mechanisms underlying its genesis,
but also provides a way to gauge the suitability of the evidence in
the context of the wider assurance case. We illustrate our work
by application to a real example–an unmanned aircraft system–
where we invoke a formal code analysis tool from its autopilot
software safety case, automatically transform the veriﬁcation
output into an evidence argument, and then integrate it into
the former.
Index Terms—Safety cases, Safety case patterns, Formal meth-
ods, Argumentation, Software certiﬁcation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the prescriptive safety certiﬁcation regime for software,
assurance largely involves demonstrating that software will
function as intended, achieved by showing (to a regulatory
authority) that it complies with a number of process objectives
set forth in the certiﬁcation guidance documents, e.g., DO-
178C [1]. The intention is to provide a level of assurance
proportional to the safety-criticality of software, and the objec-
tives to be met can include detailed processes to be followed
and/or speciﬁc techniques to be used.
Formal methods, and the corresponding tools, provide a
means to rigorously establish that software meets certain
properties with respect to its speciﬁcation, e.g., correctness.
As far as safety is concerned, however, it is important to
reason about software considerations in the system context
to assure, for example, that the properties against which
software has been certiﬁed do not adversely affect system
safety. Safety cases, or more generally, assurance cases have
emerged as a way to reason about both system safety and
software considerations for system safety, where the focus is
on product-speciﬁc evidence and argumentation.
Assurance cases link evidence (such as that produced by
applying the prescribed veriﬁcation processes, methods, and
tools), to the stated assurance claims through a structured
argument, while explicitly clarifying the applicable context,
the assumptions made, and the justiﬁcations given. The role of
the assurance case is to make a convincing and valid argument
that a system meets its assurance requirements for a given
application in a given operating environment.
The work in this paper is motivated, in part, by the following
questions: (i) given a tool implementing a formal method, if
the tool output will be used as evidence to support claims made
in a system/software safety case, why should the output of that
tool be trusted? (ii) assuming the output can be considered to
be trustworthy, i.e., the tool does, in fact, implement the formal
method, is the output suitable to support the claims for which
it will be used as evidence?
The ﬁrst question is an issue of tool assurance; prescriptive
certiﬁcation recognizes the need to assure that tools adequately
perform their intended function, and recommends tool quali-
ﬁcation, e.g., using DO-330 [2], based upon whether they are
used during development or veriﬁcation, and their potential
safety impact. The approach for assurance is essentially similar
to that in DO-178C, i.e., by appeal to a set of process objec-
tives. The second question is an issue of the appropriateness of
applying a formal method, or more speciﬁcally, the results of
that formal method for software safety assurance. Additional
prescriptive guidance exists for applying formal methods, e.g.,
DO-333 [3]. Again, the approach for assurance is similar to
DO-178C, although an additional set of objectives apply.
We make two observations here: ﬁrst, in the same way
as for prescriptive certiﬁcation of software [4], the link to
safety is only implicit through an appeal to the satisfaction of
process objectives when we assure (qualify) a formal method
(tool) to be used for software safety assurance. That is, the
rationale for using product-speciﬁc evidence and argumenta-
tion to assure system/software safety, is equally applicable
for assuring formal methods/tools when they are applied in
the context of safety assurance. Second, the output from
formal methods/tools has been included in assurance cases
largely as black-box evidence, i.e., usually only the result of
applying the formal method/tool is referenced. In this case,
there exists an assurance deﬁcit [5] about the evidence asserted
to support a claim, since little can be substantiated about the
trustworthiness and suitability of the tool output in the context
of the (higher-level) system/software requiring assurance.
We assert that an evidence argument including additional
information, such as the tool-speciﬁc claims made, and the as-
sumptions/reasoning underlying the formal method/tool, pro-
vides a richer view of tool-based evidence. This argument can
be independently scrutinized to reduce the assurance deﬁcit
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Fig. 1. Tool-based evidence integration architecture (for AUTOCERT)
Previously [6], we showed how such an evidence argument
could be created, from the output of a theorem prover based
veriﬁcation tool, and then integrated automatically into the
wider assurance case. In this paper, we generalize and improve
our previous work. In particular, our paper makes the following
contribution: we describe a generic framework for integrating
a formal method/tool into an assurance case such that (a) the
method/tool can be directly invoked from the environment
being used to construct a software assurance case, (b) the
output of the tool can be automatically converted into an
evidence argument and then integrated into the assurance case
from which the tool was invoked.
We illustrate our approach by application to a real example
system, the Swift Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) [7],
where we verify a low-level software function in the autopilot,
by invoking a code analysis tool from the software safety case,
and then transform and integrate the tool output as an evidence
argument. We have also implemented this approach in our
assurance case toolset, AdvoCATE [8].
II. APPROACH
Fig. 1 shows an architecture for our approach for tool-
based evidence integration. Note that although the integration
interface shown (dotted box 2, in Fig. 1) is speciﬁc to the
AUTOCERT code analysis tool [9], the overall architecture is
generic and applicable to other formal methods/tools.
The key idea behind our approach is that the integration of a
formal method/tool can be speciﬁed using argument structure
patterns (or safety case patterns). Patterns are intended to
capture repeatedly used structures of successful (i.e., correct,
comprehensive and convincing arguments), within a safety
case [10]. In effect, they provide a reusable approach to safety
argumentation by serving as a means to capture expertise,
known best practices, successful certiﬁcation approaches, and
solutions that have evolved over time.
The existing notion of a pattern is an argument structure,
often speciﬁed graphically using the goal structuring notation
(GSN) [11]. It abstractly captures the reasoning linking certain
(types of) claims to the available (types of) evidence, and is ac-
companied by clear guidelines for its usage. We have extended
and formalized patterns to include well-founded recursion and
multiplicity constraints [12], which are necessary for capturing
the reasoning underlying a tool-based formal veriﬁcation (e.g.,
as shown in Fig. 2).
In general, we consider formal veriﬁcation to have a divide-
and-conquer form. More speciﬁcally, the generic “architec-
ture” of a formal argument is formalization, followed by
repeated decomposition (of various kinds), followed by re-
peated solutions (e.g., function inspection, proof of a veriﬁ-
cation condition, etc.).Formal veriﬁcation provides data that
we use to instantiate parameters of the patterns (deﬁning
the formalization, decompositions, and solutions), thus giving
an instance argument. The patterns are also typed, both on
the parameters (e.g., function, veriﬁcation condition) and the
argument nodes (e.g., formal claim, assumption, etc.). These
types are drawn from a (formal) ontology (not discussed here),
which systematically deﬁnes the concepts used by a tool.
To integrate a formal method/tool we must provide these
patterns and a mapping from tool output to pattern parameters.
We specify the mapping as a pattern data table, i.e., a tabular
form which maps patterns parameters to their possible values
drawn from the tool output. Instantiation is algorithmic [12],
and it produces a well-formed evidence argument instance that
more comprehensively substantiates the tool output.
Effectively, the evidence argument can be considered as
a transformation of the existing compendium of information
embodied by the formal veriﬁcation, i.e., formalized claims,
speciﬁc decompositions and the corresponding formalized sub-
claims, the relevant assumptions and the low-level solutions,
into an argument structure. An advantage of this transforma-
tion, we believe, is that tool-based evidence and its suitability
for safety assurance is now explicit and can be inspected in a
uniﬁed way.
III. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
To illustrate our approach, we will use AUTOCERT as the
target formal tool for integration, and the Swift UAS as the
system in which software safety assurance is required. First,
we elaborate the formalization and integration interfaces: we
brieﬂy describe the nature of veriﬁcation in AUTOCERT; then,
we specify the argument structure patterns embodying veriﬁ-
cation in AUTOCERT, using GSN. Finally, we exemplify the
usage by automatically creating and integrating an evidence
argument instance, to support a software safety claim made in
a fragment of the autopilot software safety case of the Swift
UAS [7].
A. Veriﬁcation in AUTOCERT
AUTOCERT [9] is a static source-code analysis tool, which
performs a two-phase veriﬁcation: ﬁrst, given a speciﬁed safety
policy (e.g., all array indices are within speciﬁed bounds) or a
correctness requirement (e.g., code implements a mathematical
equation), it uses mathematical annotation schemas to infer
logical invariants on the source code; from these, it then gen-
erates veriﬁcation conditions (VCs). In a second phase, VCs
are checked using automated theorem provers. The proofs of
the VCs constitute the primary veriﬁcation evidence. However,
AUTOCERT also produces an XML output ﬁle which encodes
the essential information contained in the overall inference:
the invariants, the dependencies between the invariants, the
veriﬁcation conditions, axioms used, as well as links to the
proofs of the veriﬁcation conditions. We specify the input to
AUTOCERT as a set of assumptions and requirements, each of
which is an assertion about the safety/correctness of variables
in the code being veriﬁed.
The speciﬁcation formalizes software requirements which,
in turn, either derive from system requirements deﬁned during
the safety analysis, or are a product of safety analysis applied
at the software-level. The formal veriﬁcation takes place in the
context of a logical domain theory, i.e., a set of axioms and
function speciﬁcations. Axioms can be subjected to increasing
levels of scrutiny, going from simply assuming that they
are valid, to inspecting them, up to testing them against an
executable model which can, itself, be inspected [13].
B. Patterns for Reasoning in AUTOCERT
Prior to invoking a formal method/tool, such as AUTOCERT,
informally speciﬁed claims must be formalized in the language
of the tool. We use the claim formalization pattern (CFP), as
shown in Fig. 1, for this purpose. Due to space constraints, we
do not discuss this pattern here; however, the structure of the
pattern is simply that an informal claim is developed into (one
or more) formal sub-claims by using an appropriate logic or
formal language. In our case, the formal language is the input
language of AUTOCERT.
As discussed in Section II, the next step to integrate a
formal veriﬁcation tool is to capture the reasoning embodied
by the tool as an argument structure pattern. For integrating
AUTOCERT, two patterns reﬂect its veriﬁcation architecture:
the AUTOCERT functional architecture decomposition pattern,
and the AUTOCERT formal property decomposition pattern.
1) AUTOCERT Functional Architecture Decomposition:
We only brieﬂy describe this pattern and do not provide its
structural speciﬁcation since, primarily, functional decomposi-
tion in AUTOCERT is not invoked for the example claim being
veriﬁed later (See Section III-C); and secondarily, due to space
constraints. The main intent of the AUTOCERT functional
architecture decomposition pattern is to encode how the claim
that an implementation meets its requirements is developed by
logical decomposition over its constituent components, i.e., its
functional architecture.
The ﬁrst strategy is to address localized requirements rele-
vant to the implementation. A localization claim/requirement
may take the form that a variable in the code being veriﬁed
traces to a valid requirements concept, such as a signal. The
sub-claims produced address, respectively, the set of relevant





Fig. 2. AUTOCERT formal property decomposition pattern
AUTOCERT determines the traces for correct localization, and
is represented in the pattern as a parameteric solution node.
Then, to establish that the requirements relevant for the
implementation are met, as part of its analysis AUTOCERT
derives the functional architecture of the implementation. We
represent this as the strategy that the constituent component-
level requirements are met, in the context of the relevant
components and signals of the recovered functional archi-
tecture. In this step, AUTOCERT derives guarantees about
certain connected components, which are used as assumptions
in other components, and also the localization of the relevant
variables in the code. Since each formal component may itself
have multiple derived requirements, and since the functional
architecture can be hierarchically organized, the procedure is
iterative. We represent iteration in the pattern using the loop
construct [12]. When an atomic requirement is reached, i.e.,
it is the lowest-level requirement, then AUTOCERT applies
property decomposition, which we describe next.
2) AUTOCERT Formal Property Decomposition: Fig. 2
shows the AUTOCERT formal property decomposition pattern,
whose intent is to substantiate a formal requirement by formal
property decomposition, and/or inspection.
The top-level claim, G1, of this pattern, is that a formal
requirement, i.e., a property of an element, holds at a speciﬁc
location. An element can be code, a formal model, etc.,
whereas a location can be a speciﬁc line number for code,
a ﬁle, etc. We develop this top-level claim using one of two
strategies: a formal decomposition strategy, S1; or inspection,
S2. Applying S1 produces either one or more sub-claims of the
same type as the parent claim, or one or more VCs, G2. The
former represents an iterative decomposition (reﬂected by the
loop from S1 to G1). To develop the latter, AUTOCERT calls an
appropriate theorem prover (Context C5) and the underlying
strategy (S3) is a proof of correctness. The resultant sub-claim
(G3) is that proof exists (solution E1) for the VC. Note, here,
that S2 represents the condition when AUTOCERT fails to
decompose a formal requirement or produce a VC, therefore
requiring human interaction for continuing veriﬁcation.
C. Usage for Software Assurance
To illustrate the usage of our approach, we verify a low
level software claim for the Swift UAS autopilot: that the
implementation of the controller computing the value of the
aileron control variable, during descent, is correct1.
Fig. 3 shows the fragment of the autopilot software safety
case where this claim is made (the argument structure con-
necting the nodes G4 through G7, where the goal node G7
is the claim of interest). To develop G7, ﬁrst we formalize it
by applying the CFP. In our implementation in AdvoCATE,
either the end-user interactively supplies the CFP parameter
values, or they can be drawn from an AUTOCERT certiﬁcation
ﬁle. Thereafter, our instantiation algorithm [12] automatically
creates the instance (shown in Fig. 3 as the argument structure
connecting the goal nodes G7–G9 and G53).
The claim in goal node G53 is the formalized equiva-
lent (using the AUTOCERT input language) of the informal
requirement in goal node G7. This is the point at which
we invoke AUTOCERT for veriﬁcation. Based on the source
code under veriﬁcation, AUTOCERT can determine whether to
apply functional architecture decomposition before property
decomposition. In this case, only the property decomposition
applies. Subsequently, we map the veriﬁcation output produced
to a pattern data table consistent with the AUTOCERT formal
property decomposition pattern (Fig. 2), which is then used
for instantiation.
The instance argument structure produced, i.e., the evidence
argument, encodes the reasoning and the output from AUTO-
CERT formal veriﬁcation, which is then grafted onto the node
from which the tool was invoked. In Fig. 3, this is the argument
structure from node G53 (inclusive) downwards. Note that
developing claim G53 into sub-claim G5 employs strategy
S33, which is identical to the child strategy, S5, of the sub-
claim G5. This corresponds to one unrolling of the loop in the
AUTOCERT formal property decomposition pattern, i.e., what
1Note that although this is a correctness requirement, it is also a safety
requirement as determined through safety analysis of the Swift UAS and its
software system.
is shown is only one step in the veriﬁcation.The AUTOCERT
output determines the number of loop unrollings, which the
instantiation algorithm uses to create the complete evidence
argument, shown as a bird’s eye view in Fig. 4.
IV. DISCUSSION
Currently, our implementation in AdvoCATE has a hard-
coded integration of AUTOCERT. However, thus far, we have
only described one aspect of the integration, i.e., the speci-
ﬁcation of the patterns representing the reasoning underlying
a formal method/tool. To make the infrastructure fully exten-
sible, we need to consider the data that should be associated
with a tool and how it should be speciﬁed. We specify the
tool integration as embeddings into the three pattern types:
formalization, decomposition, and solution (i.e., divide and
conquer). Then, we need to specify:
(i) the set of patterns giving the architecture of the veri-
ﬁcation: namely formalization, decomposition, and so-
lutions, i.e., effectively, the semantics of the tool. De-
pending on the formal method/tool, there can be multiple
forms of decomposition and solution.
(ii) a mapping from tool output to pattern parameters: the
mapping could be expressed in an instantiation ﬁle (i.e.,
a ﬁle where we specify a mapping between XML tags,
say, and pattern parameters).
(iii) the syntax of the tool input and output: the input should
be speciﬁed in terms of an ontology. The tool input
syntax relates to the formalization pattern.
(iv) how to invoke the tool, i.e., commands and arguments.
Effectively, by encoding the reasoning underlying a formal
method as a pattern that can be independently inspected,
we specify a basis to gauge the trustworthiness of that
method. Furthermore, by instantiating the pattern, we create
concrete links from the veriﬁcation items, embodying tool-
based evidence, to the relevant system/software safety claims.
We believe this offers an approach to judge the suitability and
integrity of the tool-based evidence asserted to support the
system/software safety claims.
An advantage of an evidence argument for a formal
method/tool is that it allows formal reasoning and evidence to
be integrated into the language of assurance arguments rather
than be treated as separate artifacts. This provides a simple
form of evidence management [14] and the ability to drill down
to details of a veriﬁcation, from within the argument itself. It
also allows higher-level requirements and the corresponding
claims, to be (automatically) traceable to low-level evidence.
Hierarchical abstraction [18] of the evidence argument (not
shown in this paper), allows us to hide some proof details and
only expose in the argument, those steps that are relevant for
tracing the formalized requirements to both code and higher-
level requirements.
Assurance cases have been shown to be both complementary
to, and compatible with, prescriptive safety certiﬁcation [4];
we assert that the same is true also of evidence arguments. To
illustrate, we brieﬂy describe how an evidence argument can
Fig. 3. Fragment of the autopilot software safety case, containing a formalized claim, substantiated by an evidence argument generated from the output of
AUTOCERT and the integration interface. Only one step in the evidence argument has been shown.
be mapped to some of the objectives in DO-333 [3]: the pres-
criptive guidance for using formal methods with DO-178C [1].
For example, each claim corresponding to a requirement (e.g.,
the claim in goal node G7 in Fig. 4) that is formalized using the
CFP (e.g., the claim in goal node G33 in Fig. 4), the evidence
argument explicitly links to the solutions that justify them
(e.g., the proof references in solution nodes E1, E2, and so
on). These traces map to objectives FM3 and FM4 (coverage
of high-level, and low-level requirements) in the Table FM.C7
of DO-333: Veriﬁcation of Veriﬁcation Process Objectives.
Furthermore, the evidence argument explicitly links code to
the relevant requirements (e.g., the link from context nodes
C43, C44, C47, upwards to goal node G7, via goal node G53),
which maps to objective 5 (source code traceability to low-
level requirements) in Table FM.C5 of DO-333: Veriﬁcation
of Outputs of Software Coding and Integration Process. Other
such mappings also exist between the evidence argument and
many of the objectives in DO-333.
Evidence argument produced by automatically instantiating the 
AutoCert formal property decomposition pattern 
Fragment of Swift UAS autopilot software safety case  
from which formalization and AutoCert invocation occurs 
Argument structure instantiating the claim formalization pattern 
Fig. 4. Bird’s eye view of the integrated evidence argument: AUTOCERT
invoked on the formal claim produces veriﬁcation data, used to instantiate
the AUTOCERT formal property decomposition pattern; then the instance is
grafted onto the original safety case fragment.
This paper generalizes our earlier ideas on integrating for-
mal methods into assurance cases [6], to enable the principled
integration of other formal methods/tools. Other integration
frameworks also exist [15] for producing/maintaining claims
supported by formally generated evidence. The distinction
from our work is the focus on integrating different tools
from the viewpoint of capturing a distributed workﬂow. Other
workﬂow-based methods for integrating evidence from formal
veriﬁcation methods have been considered in [16]; however,
evidence is included as a reference to veriﬁcation outputs as
in current practice, in contrast with our new approach for
integrating the entire evidence argument. Conﬁdence argu-
ments [5] are a complementary approach to ours for reducing
assurance deﬁcits by specifying the sources of assurance
deﬁcits in evidence, and justifying their mitigation; whereas an
evidence argument highlights the reasoning underlying speciﬁc
formal method/tool output that is used as evidence. Our work
is also closely related to the evidence metamodel [17] which
describes the interface between arguments and evidence.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
To address the questions of suitability and trustworthiness
of tool-based evidence included in a software assurance case
(Section I), our solution is to include an evidence argument
instead of, simply, a reference to the output of the tool.
Our tool, AdvoCATE, provides a principled basis for for-
malizing claims, e.g., using the CFP. Together with our ar-
chitecture for tool-based evidence integration we can support
formalized claims through evidence arguments, generated by
instantiating patterns, encoding formal veriﬁcation rationale,
using the veriﬁcation output from a corresponding formal
tool. We believe this architecture is generic enough also to be
able to integrate other formal methods/tools, including those
for deductive veriﬁcation, abstract interpretation and model
checking. In fact, AUTOCERT, is an example of a formal tool
based upon deductive veriﬁcation; we also have a preliminary
integration interface for the tool, IKOS (Inference Kernel for
Open Static Analyzers), whose underlying formal method is
abstract interpretation.
An advantage of our implementation, is that AdvoCATE
can provide a uniﬁed and convenient interface for using
formal veriﬁcation tools. Currently, it only allows invoking
the tool (and integrating the results into arguments), but we
envision uniﬁed mechanisms for reporting results as well as
choosing tools. However, our approach has not yet addressed
the argument about the tool itself, i.e., its qualiﬁcation, or the
extent of assurance that a particular formal method/tool can
provide. We believe that these are potentially promising areas
for future work.
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